Cardano Updates

Co-Authored-By: John A. Lotoski <[email protected]>

Co-authored-by: Mateusz Galazyn <[email protected]>

Two config changes to make the smoke cluster behave like the sim-rs
Linear-Leios reference scenarios rather than a stress test.

1. `[validation]` in mainnet.toml: switch RB-body validation cost
   from a flat `1000.0 ms` constant to sim-rs's
   `0.3539 ms + 2.151e-05 ms/byte` formula, and surface
   `tx_validation_ms = 0.6201` (matches sim-rs's amortised-Plutus
   `tx-validation-cpu-time-ms`).  At 90 KiB max RB body the new
   constant is ~2.4 ms — 3-hop propagation now finishes well under
   the 3-slot pre-voting buffer, where the old 1 s/hop pushed RB
   adoption past the voting window and forced every non-producer
   voter into `WrongEB`.

2. `rb_generation_probability` in sample-cluster.toml: revert from
   `0.2` (cluster-wide ≈ 1 RB / 5 s) to the base-config `0.05`
   (≈ 1 RB / 20 s, mainnet-like).  The high rate packed multiple
   RBs into each EB's voting window and meant the chain tip
   typically moved past the EB-referencing RB before quorum could
   gather, so no EB ever certified.

Together these match sim-rs's empirical 40%-certification working
point and let the cluster reach `RbCertifiedEb` end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Two changes to the Leios voting flow.

1. `decide_vote` previously called `mark_voted` on *any* predicate
   failure, so a voter that hit `WrongEB`, `LateRBHeader`, or
   `MissingTX` on the first slot of the Voting phase had no chance
   to retry next slot when their chain-tip caught up or the missing
   TX arrived.  In the 25-node cluster this gave ~1 vote per EB
   (the producer's), nowhere near quorum.

   Only `LateEB` is genuinely permanent — `eb_seen_slot` is fixed at
   receipt, once-late is always-late.  The other three are transient.
   Skip `mark_voted` on the transient reasons so `EligibleToVote`
   re-fires every slot of the Voting window.  `EmitVote` still calls
   `mark_voted` so a successful vote happens at most once per EB.

   Effect on the smoke test: best-EB vote count went from 1 to 18
   out of 25, which crosses the quorum threshold and produces the
   first end-to-end `RbCertifiedEb` events.

2. `emit_vote` only logged the bundle at `info!` level; the
   `VTBundleGenerated` telemetry variant defined in `telemetry.rs`
   was never constructed.  Push it onto `pending_telemetry` parallel
   to `LeiosNoVote` so the UI can show producer flashes.

Updated the two `con-rs` unit tests that asserted the
"`mark_voted` after WrongEB" behaviour, and added a positive test
for the new "transient reasons re-fire each slot" semantic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Two related sizing fixes for protocol 19 (LeiosFetch).

1. Per-protocol ingress channel capacity was a single
   `egress_queue_size: 16` value used for every protocol.  At 25-node-
   cluster scale, an EB-tx response can fragment into ~256 segments
   and overshoots a 16-deep mpsc instantly, killing the mux.  Split
   into three named tiers in `peer_task.rs`:
     - `HIGH_VOLUME_QUEUE_SIZE   = 256` (chainsync, blockfetch,
       txsubmission, leios_notify) — kilobyte-sized messages
     - `BULK_FETCH_QUEUE_SIZE    = 4096` (leios_fetch only) — sized
       to hold a worst-case 12 KiB-segmented multi-MB delivery plus
       headroom for the next request
     - `LOW_VOLUME_QUEUE_SIZE    = 4` (keepalive, peersharing) — slow
       fixed-size traffic

2. `MuxError::IngressOverflow` was reused for both byte-budget overflow
   and channel-full: the resulting message read
   "{queued bytes} exceeds limit {byte budget}" even when the byte
   budget was *not* exceeded, because the channel filled first.  Add
   a sibling `IngressChannelFull { queued, capacity }` variant and
   use it on the `try_send` Full path so the log accurately points
   at the channel as the bottleneck.

3. `LeiosFetch` `INGRESS_LIMIT` and `SIZE_LIMIT_LARGE` raised from
   16 MiB to 24 MiB.  Without 50% headroom over `MAX_BLOCK_SIZE`,
   the demuxer's per-state buffer cap was hit by the very last SDU
   of a max-size delivery (codec hadn't drained earlier segments
   yet), tearing the connection down at the end of every full-size
   EB-tx response.  Per-message safety is still enforced inside
   the CBOR codec via the unchanged `MAX_BLOCK_SIZE`,
   `MAX_TRANSACTIONS`, `MAX_VOTES`, `MAX_TRANSACTION_SIZE` caps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>

When a `BlockFetch` request fails, `on_block_fetch_failed` previously
removed the in-flight marker and immediately re-ran chain selection.
The same peer's announced fragment still pointed at the missing point,
so `select_chain_once` reached the same `WaitingForBlocks { peer_id }`
decision and re-issued the fetch from the same peer in microseconds.
Under any persistent fetch failure (e.g. a peer that NoBlocks every
request) this busy-loops at hundreds of thousands of iterations per
second — disk I/O from the resulting log spam can starve slot ticks
and cascade into cluster-wide fork divergence.

Add `BLOCK_FETCH_COOLDOWN` (2 s) and a `block_fetch_cooldown` map on
`PraosState`.  `on_block_fetch_failed` now takes the responsible
`PeerId`, inserts a cooldown entry, and `evaluate_and_fetch_internal`
merges those peers into its `skip` set so the fetch policy picks a
different candidate.

`NetworkEvent::BlockFetchFailed` now carries `peer_id: Option<PeerId>`
so the wrapper can pass it through.  `Some(p)` is the normal "this
peer failed" case; `None` means the coordinator never reached any
peer for the requested fragment, so there is no one to penalise and
the wrapper skips the cooldown call.

Demoted `select_chain: fetching missing blocks`,
`fetching missing chain blocks`, and the failure log to `debug!` —
they fired at info level on every fetch decision and were the bulk
of the disk-I/O storm during the 25-node smoke.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Reshape the UTxO-HD table abstraction so the @mk@ parameter is a
single-argument @TableKind@ (indexed by @blk@) rather than a
two-argument @MapKind@ over @(TxIn blk)@ and @(TxOut blk)@. The
concrete table types (`EmptyMK`, `KeysMK`, `ValuesMK`, `DiffMK`)
are renamed to `NoTables`, `Keys`, `Values`, `Diffs` and now take
@blk@ directly.

Collapse `Ouroboros.Consensus.Ledger.Tables{,.Basics,.Combinators,
.Kinds,.MapKind,.Utils}` into a single new
`Ouroboros.Consensus.Ledger.BasicTypes` module. The old modules are
left on disk but commented out of the cabal file.

Add `empty`, `map`, and `mapKeys` to
`Ouroboros.Consensus.Ledger.Tables.Diff`, and a constant bifunctor
`K2` in `Ouroboros.Consensus.Util`, both used by the new module.

Update all 130+ call sites to the new names and shape.

Activates the timeout(1)-bounded external calls + signal-safe
emit refactor from the prior commit. publish-images resolves the
new tag, builds at c588914, pushes; both master and adversary
testnets pull the new image on next run.