Cardano Updates

Signed-off-by: Eric Torreborre <[email protected]>

Snapshot of input-output-hk/lace-platform @ 1decd4d10eb82beb335f7712840a6221fe128eb9
Produced by open-source-release-publish.yml.

See PROVENANCE for the allowlist hash that controlled this snapshot.

Co-authored-by: lace-publish-bot <[email protected]>

Snapshot of input-output-hk/lace-platform @ 1decd4d10eb82beb335f7712840a6221fe128eb9
Produced by open-source-release-publish.yml.

See PROVENANCE for the allowlist hash that controlled this snapshot.

Thsi commit serves as an example of a pattern we will use for all
ledger predicate failures for all era, except Byron.

Pulls in master's current shared-image versions:
- sidecar:1ff6913       (post legacy-probe delete, #119)
- tracer-sidecar:5271661 (fork-tree probe build)
- configurator + log-tailer + tracer + cardano-node digests already match
- tx-generator from master is intentionally not added — adversary
  testnet runs nodes only

The adversary container itself stays pinned to its own SHA
(adversary:b75cfe3) since master has no adversary equivalent.

Layer 3 of #123 (perturbation metric emit from finally_tips_agree.sh)
is dropped: that script was deleted on main by #119, the cluster-wide
"did the cluster fork" oracle now lives in tracer-sidecar's fork-tree
probe. Re-implementing the perturbation metric on top of that surface
is a follow-up.

Adds Adversary.SDK with Reachable / Sometimes assertion emitters that
write to \$ANTITHESIS_OUTPUT_DIR/sdk.jsonl (default /tmp/sdk.jsonl).
Wires two assertions into app/Main.hs:

  - reachable("adversary_chain_sync_started", {target_host, point, limit})
    fires once per invocation before connectToNode. Antithesis report
    will show, segmented by target_host, "the adversary fired against
    pN at least once". A host that never gets attacked is visible as
    a missing Reachable hit.

  - sometimes(true|false, "adversary_chain_sync_completed",
              {target_host, tip|reason})
    fires once per invocation on completion. true on clean exit,
    false on connect/protocol failure. Sometimes-true vs Sometimes-
    false buckets quantify how often the adversary actually completed
    a full --limit sync vs being cut short by chaos.

Layer 1 of three for issue #123.

This PR tweaks the recently merged generic voting committee interface
around aggregatable types to better accommodate the fact that
cryptographic aggregation of signatures can fail (in very rare cases).
Previously, we had encapsulated this problem by collecting keys and
signatures and aggregating them at verification time. The new interface
is more faithful and accounts for the new failure mode in a more honest
way.

In addition, it renames the `CryptoSupportsAggregateVRF` class into
`CryptoSupportsBatchVRFVerification`, since the new interface
constraints the inputs to _not_ be aggregated at (batch) verification
time, so that implementations that require binding keys to VRF outputs
can do so more directly and explicitly.

Finally, it removes the trivial aggregation helpers introduced in #1974,
as concrete implementations of the new aggregation interface will not
benefit much from having them, so there's no need to maintain unused
code for which we have no plans to use in the long term either.